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ABSTRACT 
 
Physical Security System Sensitivity to DBT Perturbations. (August 2012) 
Curtis Alan Conchewski, B.S., Texas A&M University 
Co-Chairs of Advisory Committee: Dr. David Boyle
Dr. William Charlton  
 
 This thesis examines how perturbing selected adversary capabilities in a design 
basis threat (DBT) may affect the assessment of a facility’s security system performance.  
We found that using a strictly defined DBT to design and analytically test facility 
security systems can lead to invalid assessments that security measures are meeting 
standards.  Design Basis Threats are intended to represent the most severe yet realistic 
attack a facility might face.  However, the static nature of the standard DBT makes it 
unable to test the performance of a facility security system in the case where a 
specialized adversary may possess different capabilities than defined in the DBT.  Our 
analysis of security system performance for various modeled facilities revealed 
significant vulnerabilities to certain perturbations of adversary capabilities. These 
vulnerabilities went undetected when the original strictly defined graded DBT was used 
in the assessment procedure.  By maximizing one adversary capability at the expense of 
others, a specialized adversary force was able to efficiently defeat each facility.  
To address this problem, we proposed employing a so-called “point-based” DBT 
as an alternative to the existing strictly defined DBT. In a point-based DBT, multiple 
scenarios are assessed that test different sets of adversary capabilities to better uncover 
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and understand any security system vulnerabilities that may exist. We believe the benefit 
of identifying these site-specific security vulnerabilities will outweigh the additional cost 
of generating a point-based DBT, especially if the vulnerabilities are identified during 
the initial design of the security system. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 Most security systems for high value nuclear targets are designed using specific 
threat definitions as suggested by the IAEA. Security designers use these threat 
definitions to test a facility’s physical security system to ensure adequate protection is in 
place. The design basis threat (DBT) is often an amalgamation of current threats due to 
our inability to accurately define an actual future adversarial actor. We hypothesized that 
using a DBT with explicitly defined threat capabilities can result in exploitable security 
vulnerabilities when the threat is incorrectly defined. This thesis analyzes the sensitivity 
of several physical security systems to DBT perturbations, based on how the security 
system’s performance changes against the perturbed threat. Multiple facility security 
systems were modeled with features capable of defeating the initial DBT. Elements of 
this DBT were then perturbed, enabling determination of the threat characteristics most 
important to correctly define and the consequences of small variations in the threat. 
Following this work’s analysis of the current DBT system, two end-products are 
discussed: a tabulation of the DBT characteristics that produce the greatest change in 
security performance when altered and an alternative point-based approach to the current 
DBT methodology. 
 
 
___________ 
This thesis follows the style of Nuclear Science and Engineering. 
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1.1 Design Basis Threat Background 
 To ensure that high consequence nuclear material is adequately protected, the 
IAEA recommends the use of a design basis threat (DBT). This recommendation is 
found in INFCIRC/225/Rev5 1, which requires the use of a design basis threat (DBT) or 
a threat assessment devised by the State’s competent authority. A DBT is a state-
designed adversarial threat which the security systems at applicable facilities must be 
capable of defeating. Adversary characteristics such as the number of attackers, financial 
backing, equipment, weapons, training, insider support, motivation, and employed 
tactics are all explicitly defined in a “strictly defined” DBT. In the United States, 
multiple agencies contribute to and help construct the DBT based on input from the 
intelligence community’s assessment of credible threats. An accurate DBT allows for the 
efficient implementation of security features, allocation of resources, and confidence in 
the security system as a whole. Due to the continuously changing range of threats that 
possess the motivation and capability of striking US assets, it is impossible to guarantee 
that the most likely threat is encompassed by the current DBT. Since an actual attack is 
unlikely to look exactly like the adversary in the DBT, it is important that the physical 
security system be able to handle threats with characteristics that differ from those 
defined in the DBT. 
 While it is possible for a state to develop either a separate DBT for each facility 
or a single state-wide threat assessment, it is more common to use a “graded” DBT 
system (sometimes referred to as a tiered DBT). For this approach, the state’s competent 
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authority divides its facilities into several grades based on the category of material 
contained or the consequences of a successful adversary action. A DBT is then designed 
for each grade rather than for each facility. The use of a graded system instead of a 
single nationwide DBT has the benefit of balancing risk amongst different categories of 
facilities. A hospital with medical sources need not be capable of defeating the same 
highly trained adversary force that comprises the DBT of a highly enriched uranium 
(HEU) storage facility. With a graded DBT, the hospital is placed on a lower grade than 
the HEU depot. A balance of risk between the facilities is established with the graded 
DBT, as the HEU depot’s higher consequence level is offset by the enhanced security 
features necessary to defeat the higher grade DBT. Facility risk is proportional to the 
probability and consequences of a successful adversary attack. The mechanics behind 
how risk is calculated and used are discussed in Section 2. 
 The graded DBT system is commonly used based on the belief that it is the most 
efficient middle ground between use of a statewide DBT and separate DBTs for each 
nuclear asset. Questions about the validity of this belief motivated this thesis. 
1.2 Background and Literature Review of Nuclear Security 
 The basics of nuclear material physical protection methods are established and 
mandated in INFCIRC/274/Rev1 2, which requires compliant parties to provide a 
sufficient level of protection for nuclear assets. The jurisdiction of required State 
protection is expanded to include all in-state transportation and transit out of country 
until the new host country takes charge. This document also breaks down what types and 
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quantities of material constitute the three IAEA categories of nuclear material that must 
be protected. Category I material includes unirradiated plutonium (as long as the 238Pu 
concentration is less than 80%), unirradiated HEU, and unirradiated 233U. This category 
requires the most stringent security, including storage in a designated protected area, 
constant surveillance with guards in close communication to the response force, access 
restricted to only those with special clearance, and special measures to ensure detection 
and prevention of an assault. This is the level of material that represents the target 
throughout the thesis work and normally calls for the highest grade of a graded DBT. 
 More specific recommendations on how this level of security should be 
established are found in INFCIRC/225/Rev5 1. This document provides an in-depth look 
at the State’s responsibility: international transport, physical protection, risk 
management, defense in depth, security culture, quality assurance, and confidentiality. 
The physical protection responsibilities include planning and preparing a response force 
to deal with the threats of theft and sabotage, as well as requirements for each category 
of material to prevent or mitigate these threats. This information circular also introduces 
the concept of a design basis threat as a follow-up to a threat assessment for high value 
material or targets. The IAEA describes the basics of an effective protection system as a 
function of detection, delay, and response. The detection, delay, and response format 
with an evolving DBT forms the backbone of physical security design in most nuclear 
countries and for multiple agencies within the United States.  
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 The IAEA goes into further detail of how to construct and use a DBT in their 
Nuclear Security Series No.10, “Development, Use and Maintenance of the Design 
Basis Threat” 3 implementation guide. Whereas other IAEA documents mentioned the 
benefits of or the need to use a DBT, this document is entirely focused on the DBT 
concept and goes through each step of its establishment, use, and upkeep. The DBT is 
stated to be “a comprehensive description of the motivation, intentions, and capabilities 
of potential adversaries against which protection systems are designed and evaluated. 
Such definitions permit security planning on the basis of risk management. A DBT is 
derived from credible intelligence information and other data concerning threats, but it is 
not intended to be a statement about actual, prevailing threats.” This last part is 
important in its acknowledgement that, based on the realistic limitations of intelligence 
collection, the DBT will never precisely represent the actual threat facing the facility, 
and in fact, is not intended to. It is unlikely for any one adversary group to possess all 
the capabilities of the DBT, which are compiled from analysis of all possible adversaries 
with the capability and motivation to attack the facility. A more detailed look into the 
role of intelligence with regards to nuclear security can be found in the Nonproliferation 
Review article, “Indispensable Intelligence and Inevitable Failures” by Torrey Froscher4. 
Froscher’s assertion that the intelligence that leads to the characteristics of the DBT can 
never be exact or complete, demonstrates the value of this thesis which seeks to 
understand and limit security system performance sensitivities to the DBT. 
 To understand how perturbations of the DBT can affect the physical security 
system’s performance, it is necessary to understand the security system design. A 
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thorough and commonly used top level perspective is given in Mary Lynn Garcia’s 
“Design and Evaluation of Physical Protection Systems,” 5. Garcia establishes the 
reasoning and mathematics behind detection and delay and explains the concept of risk 
as calculated in terms of physical protection system (PPS) properties, attack probability, 
and consequence. An interesting discussion about the definition of risk and the difficulty 
of conducting cost-benefit analysis of physical security is found in Sandia’s “Risk-Based 
Cost-Benefit Analysis for Security Assessment Problems,” 6. This book delves further 
into using game theory to depict the probability of attack and presents deterrence and 
devaluation as forms of dissuasion that seek to influence the adversary’s decision 
making process. Probability of attack and the value of deterrence are notorious for being 
difficult, if not impossible, to quantify accurately due to the need to understand the 
adversary’s motivation, values, and decision making process. Instead, Sandia believes 
security investment should be based on consequence and attack scenario difficulty. The 
attack scenario consists of two main phases: preparation and execution. Both phases 
have multiple steps the attackers must perform which the host government could 
discover and compromise. Sandia further discusses how threat assessment is highly 
based on the target, which is in some contrast to the state level or graded DBT approach 
commonly used. 
 The need to ensure the highest degree of security for nuclear assets has been 
repeatedly brought to the public’s attention through congressional testimonies and 
oversight reports.  The GAO’s testimony to Congress on the NRC in 2007 7 revealed 
differences between the NRC’s and the DOE’s DBT, despite both protecting high 
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consequence material such as HEU. An additional critique in the same testimony 
included the perception that the NRC’s DBT was based as much on recommendations 
from vendors as it was from security experts. Several adversarial capabilities the experts 
recommended were removed based on financial concerns. Possible deficiencies in the 
NRC’s DBT were again brought to public attention in August 2010 in the CRS Report 
for Congress 8. The main deficiency sited was vulnerability to aircraft crashes in older 
nuclear power plants. It is our belief that further development of physical security design 
could help persuade public interest groups that the safety of the public is still considered 
a top priority. The departments and agencies responsible for our nuclear infrastructure 
could demonstrate this development by reducing PPS sensitivity to the DBT.   
 While the author is familiar with DOE building practices with regards to physical 
security, DOD methods were extrapolated from a current DOD security engineering 
planning manual 9. This document explains basic scenario considerations and the facility 
features designed to counter the adversary’s actions or mitigate consequences.  
A reasonably current (2004) listing of existing terrorist threats, including 
capabilities and intent, created by the RAND Corporation 10, was consulted to determine 
which DBT capabilities to perturb in this thesis. This RAND document also discusses 
the capability-versus-intent plot often used to show the highest current threats to the 
United States as well as which groups could become threats with shifts in funding or 
ideology.  
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 We researched the security designing methods employed in several non-nuclear 
industries to take advantage of modern PPS features used to protect other vital 
infrastructure systems. The article, “Infrastructure Vulnerability Assessment Model (I-
VAM),” 11 in Risk Analysis, provided insight into a security approach called I-VAM. 
The article provides additional discussion on the meaning of vulnerability and risk as 
well as a basic way to quantify deterrence that is not present in INFCIRC/225 based 
models. Later in the article, the I-VAM method is demonstrated on a medium-sized 
clean water system (source, treatment, storage, and distribution) to quantify its 
vulnerability. Another industry responsible for protecting large-footprint high 
consequence facilities often found in less than secure environments is the petroleum 
industry. A vulnerability assessment of a hypothetical refinery and the basics of 
conducting a risk assessment are found in a Journal of Petroleum Science and 
Engineering article, “Securing Oil and Gas Infrastructure,” 12. Rather than calculate risk 
against a defined threat, the article provides a checklist of security features and 
conditions. Risk values are provided for various categories such as the number of 
security elements and environmental conditions (proximity to a city, local terrorist 
activity, etc.). The total facility risk is calculated by taking the sum of the individual risk 
values. While they are an interesting alternative to using a DBT, checklist methods for 
determining risk are incapable of identifying vulnerabilities that exist based on the site’s 
layout. If Facility A has the same security elements as Facility B, they are given the 
same risk level without considering the different element layouts and site pathways. 
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1.3 Project Significance 
 This thesis analyzes the weaknesses involved with using a strictly defined graded 
DBT and presents potential improvements to the DBT design and definition process to 
mitigate those weaknesses. The conventional methods of analyzing physical security 
with the Design and Evaluation Process Outline (DEPO) Model are discussed in Section 
2. The author selected DEPO for this analysis because of the extensive availability of 
information concerning its usage and his previous experience with the model, as well as 
DEPO’s similarity to other design methodologies based on INFCIRC225/Rev5. Because 
the actual DBTs used by the various departments and agencies are classified, we devised 
an unclassified, strictly-defined graded DBT with open-source characteristics of known 
terrorist threats. The unclassified DBT was used to initially develop and test the security 
features of each facility and scenario. Quantifying physical security system sensitivity to 
the use of a strictly defined DBT revealed that the above mentioned concerns, both from 
within the national laboratory system and the public interest groups were not without 
reason. A strictly defined DBT can misrepresent the effectiveness of a security system, 
creating vulnerabilities that can be exploited by adversaries that differ from the DBT. 
This is especially true when the DBT is shared between different facilities (as in a 
graded DBT methodology). Our proposed methods to either improve the graded DBT 
system or implement a new point based DBT are described in Section 3, following 
discussion of the sensitivity analysis. 
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2.  APPROACH 
 
To verify that using a strictly defined graded DBT to determine physical security 
risk results in inherent vulnerabilities, we employed the Design and Evaluation Process 
Outline Model (DEPO). DEPO is a methodology capable of quantitatively gauging the 
effectiveness of physical security systems against adversaries with defined capabilities. 
DEPO provides a set of tools that determine the most efficient adversary pathway 
through a facility to reach a designated target. This method also quantifies the 
adversary’s ability to avoid detection, the value of physical obstacles that serve as delay 
elements, and the outcome probabilities associated with an engagement between the 
attackers and the response force. We kept the analysis quantitative so the reader can 
verify the work performed, recalculate probabilities with updated parameters, or apply 
the same mathematical models to their own problems. 
2.1 Methods Used 
 It is the objective of this thesis to understand how perturbations in the 
adversary’s capabilities will affect the physical security system’s performance against a 
strictly defined graded DBT. The term “graded” refers to a DBT system where facilities 
are graded based on the consequence or value of contained material, with each facility 
with the same grade sharing the same DBT. “Strictly defined” refers to adversary 
capabilities such as the number of attackers, weapon types, financial backing, etc. that 
have been explicitly defined rather than given as a range of possibilities. While each 
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facility’s physical security system may be designed to be capable of defeating the 
defined adversary, how each facility fairs against adversaries with unexpected 
capabilities will vary. Knowledge of each facility’s unique vulnerabilities and 
sensitivities to these unexpected capabilities should be well established and accounted 
for to help reduce the risk of system failure when an actual attack varies from what was 
expected. We hypothesized that variations in some adversary characteristics would have 
the same effect across multiple facilities whereas the sensitivity to other characteristics 
would be largely site dependent. To confirm that site specific sensitivities exist, and 
therefore that overreliance on a strictly defined DBT is dangerous, we modeled multiple 
facilities and tested their physical security systems against systematically perturbed, 
strictly defined DBTs. 
Because the modeled facilities possessed high consequence targets, they required 
sophisticated physical security systems. We validated the initial security systems by 
ensuring they were capable of defeating the realistic adversary defined in the DBT, 
discussed fully in Section 2.2. Perturbations of the DBT’s adversary characteristics 
across a realistic range resulted in changes to either the probability the response force 
would intercept the attack force (PI) or the probability the response force would prevail 
over or neutralize the attackers (PN). The level of fluctuation in PI and PN determined the 
system’s sensitivity to the DBT perturbation.  
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2.1.1 Risk Equation 
The standard risk equation calculates the overall security risk of a given facility 
(R) based on several factors:  
 Probability of an adversary attack (PA), 
 Probability of the response team intercepting the adversary (PI), 
  Probability the response team will neutralize the adversary (PN), and  
 Consequences of a successful adversary attack (C).  
The full equation commonly combines PI and PN into a probability that the attack 
will be successful (PS). The main advantage of this risk equation is its ability to compare 
different facilities to determine where to allocate resources. Facilities possessing 
different types of material can be compared based on the differences in the value of C. 
Facilities with higher consequence material such as HEU require more effective physical 
security systems to achieve the same level of acceptable risk as low risk facilities.  
The full risk equation is shown in (Eq. 1), the breakdown of PS is given in (Eq. 
2), and the substitution is shown in (Eq. 3). 
R = PA * PS * C    (Eq. 1) 
PS = 1 – PI * PN    (Eq. 2) 
R = PA * (1 – PI * PN) * C   (Eq. 3) 
The effects of perturbing the DBT on PN and PI were the primary focus for 
determining facility vulnerability. The consequence value did not change with DBT 
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variation since the target (which determines the consequences of a successful attack) is 
not a DBT parameter. For the first two modeled facilities (discussed in Section 2.3), it 
was assumed that an attack would occur and PA was set to one. Deterrence plays a major 
role in whether the adversary considers an attack to be cost effective, but deterrence is 
not accounted for with DEPO. Because deterrence is neglected, it is common to set PA to 
one. In the third modeled facility, an HEU-containing convoy and two decoy convoys, 
PA represents the probability of attacking the actual transport as opposed to a decoy. The 
adversary’s ability to simultaneously attack multiple targets, and therefore PA, depends 
on their level of resources as defined in the DBT.  
2.1.2 Probability of Interception  
A tool commonly called an adversary sequence diagram (ASD) calculates a 
given facility’s PI (see Fig. 1). The ASD’s purpose is to illustrate every reasonable 
pathway through the facility to reach the target, determine the most vulnerable pathway 
(MVP), and then calculate the overall PI associated with the MVP and the total time it 
takes to traverse the MVP. For these calculations, we assume the adversary will take the 
path of minimum detection until the point where an interception is not possible (also 
known as the critical detection point (CDP)), whereupon they would switch to the fastest 
pathway.  
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Fig. 1. Sample ASD displaying MVP of an adversary with breaching charges. 
 
The best security design practice is to maximize delay elements close to the 
target and achieve detection as far from the target as possible. Placing delay elements 
close to the target pushes the CDP further down the ASD allowing more detection 
opportunities (note: detection/assessment after the CDP has no value). The ASD is 
arranged into rows that represent the various facility security levels, such as the limited 
and protected areas, with each possible path through that level listed horizontally. Each 
pathway element has an associated delay and detection chance. For an actual facility, 
these numbers would be determined through repeated testing, but for this analysis a table 
of average values generated by Sandia National Laboratory was used. The MVP will 
involve the elements with the lowest detection probability until the CDP and the 
minimum delay elements afterwards. Assuming all security elements and pathways have 
been accounted for and the detection/delay numbers are valid, this MVP gives the worst 
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case scenario with the defined adversary. Alternatively, this methodology will fail if a 
pathway has not been considered, an insider disables a security element, or the adversary 
has greater breaching capabilities than expected (each element has a set of delay times 
based on the equipment used in the breaching maneuver). 
We constructed each facility’s ASD using the Facility Description Module of 
Sandia’s SAVI program 13. A summary of each facility and the corresponding ASD’s 
can be found in Section 2.3. More thorough descriptions are located in the Appendix, so 
that that the reader can recreate the thesis’s facilities in SAVI. Unless otherwise noted, 
all elements possess the default delay and detection characteristics found in SAVI 
Version 4.0. SAVI contains two executable modules, the Outsider Module and the 
Facility Module. The Facility Module allows the user to create an ASD complete with all 
delay and detection elements. The Outsider Analysis Module determines the MVP and 
CDP of the ASD based on user defined adversary capabilities, response force 
deployment time, intrusion method, and response strategy.  
2.1.3 Probability of Neutralization 
Although DEPO provides a fairly accurate method to calculate PI using values 
that have been developed with scores of tests, calculation of PN is either much less 
accurate or very expensive. Force-on-force exercises are one of the more accurate 
methods used to test engagements at key points of a facility, but they are costly in both 
resources and time. While this method may be the best way to test the most important 
areas of a high value facility, it is much more common to use virtual simulations such as 
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the Joint Conflict and Tactical Simulation also known as JCATS. Though significantly 
less costly than force-on-force exercises, the manpower resources required for the 
JCATS approach exceeded the scope of this project.  Since the main goal of this effort is 
to analyze changes in PN rather than to determine a single accurate value, PN was 
calculated using simple probabilities that convert various factors into force multipliers. 
The attacker and defender force multipliers were then compared in a straightforward 
fashion to determine the probability of neutralization (PN). While this approach does not 
produce the most accurate absolute results, the relative fluctuation of PN caused by 
changes in the adversary’s capabilities does provide the information we seek.  
The main factors used to determine the force multipliers for the response and 
adversary forces were: 
 Availability of cover and fortifications, 
 Combat related training and experience,  
 Level of insider assistance, and 
 Weaponry and explosives. 
The response force was given a defensive force multiplier based on the 
advantage of using cover and fortifications. This defensive advantage was predetermined 
based on the scenario, but the multiplier was lowered if the adversary possessed 
specialized weaponry (e.g., light anti-tank weaponry (LAW)). For Facility One and Two, 
the use of fortified fighting positions translated into a 2x multiplier if the adversary 
possessed LAW capability and a 3x multiplier if they did not. The response force 
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possessed a 2x cover multiplier in Facility Three when the adversary lacked LAW, but 
the multiplier was fully removed when  LAW were allowed. The cover multiplier for 
Facility Three was lower to account for armored vehicles rather than fixed positions.  
Whereas the defensive position multiplier may vary slightly with DBT 
perturbations, the other multipliers were entirely dependent on the DBT’s definition. The 
possible range of combat training and experience was split into three categories: that of 
an inexperienced novice with no real training (no multiplier), a combatant with military 
training equivalent to an Army private with limited combat experience (1.5x multiplier), 
and an experienced operator comparable to special forces (2x multiplier). The level of 
adversary training was a DBT characteristic while the response force was always given 
the 2x multiplier. When the adversary possessed sufficient insider knowledge to prepare 
for an engagement with the response force, they were provided a 1.5x force multiplier. 
This multiplier accounted for the adversary being able to: predict where the engagement 
will occur to avoid expected fields of fire or ambushes, take advantage of site features 
such as cover, and practice with specialized weaponry to neutralize defensive positions. 
Advanced weaponry and the training required to use it efficiently was portrayed as a 
range of multipliers from 1x to 5x for direct fire kinetic weapons and a 2x multiplier for 
area kill weapons such as grenades and suicide vests. The low end of the range 
represented combatants equipped either with minimal capabilities (such as handguns) or 
the inability to efficiently operate their weaponry (attempted handling of a complicated 
weapon without proper training). The response force received the maximum 5x 
multiplier due to their training with and use of high-grade military rifles, while the 
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adversary multiplier was a function of the weapon and training definitions in the DBT. If 
the adversary was defined as possessing grenades, they were given the additional 2x 
multiplier. For the purposes of this thesis, it was assumed the response force did not 
extensively use area kill weaponry. 
After force multipliers were factored into each side’s strength, simple probability 
was used to determine the odds that the response force would neutralize the attackers. 
The probability function can be compared to a series of coin flips, since each effective 
response force point was equal to an adversary force point. As an example, if the total 
response-force-to-adversary-force ratio was 5 to 2, the probability that the response force 
would win was equivalent to the odds of flipping two heads before five tails. In this case, 
each flip that results in heads represents neutralization of an adversary whereas tails 
represents a response force casualty. It is important to note that this methodology is not a 
comparison of the number of defenders versus attackers, but a comparison of the product 
of force multipliers for each side (of which the physical number of personnel is the 
original term). The combined product of force multipliers will hereafter be referred to as 
the “effective force.” Figure 2 shows the resulting curve from this probability method 
when plotting PN versus the ratio of the effective response force to effective adversary 
force.  
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Fig. 2. Probability of neutralization as a function of the effective response force (R) 
divided by the effective adversary force (A). 
 
As expected, when the two sides are of equivalent strength there is a 50% chance 
that the response force will succeed. The figure also displays the diminishing returns of 
increasing the effective response force beyond the 50% mark. Despite the diminishing 
returns, it is important to use some level of conservatism when equipping a response 
force to account for unexpected adversary capabilities. It should also be noted that even 
though the response force is generally small, it often possesses a higher effective force 
than a numerically superior adversary due to inherent force multipliers from being on the 
defending side. 
Realistic limits were placed on how far the response-to-adversary ratio was 
altered throughout the thesis work. Because the adversary was considered a rational 
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actor, it was assumed that any attack overly reliant on force rather than stealth would not 
be initiated if the effective response force was more than nine times the adversary force 
(PN = 90%). Attacks that required only one out of multiple simultaneous attacks to 
succeed were still permitted in Scenarios 3 and 4, even when each individual attack 
crossed this threshold. A limit was also placed on the adversary force. Dealing with an 
adversary force of overwhelming numbers or equipment (e.g., helicopters or heavy 
armored vehicles) falls within the domain of the state’s military rather than being the 
facility’s responsibility. A commonly used assumption limiting the adversary force is 
that an overly large force would be detected before reaching the facility, either while 
training or during deployment. Variations on the initial DBT were therefore kept to 
reasonable levels, such as the addition of two or three combatants rather than doubling 
the number of attackers. 
2.2 Facility DBT Definition 
 The baseline DBT used to construct the physical security systems for each test 
facility was designed to represent what would be used for a facility possessing Category 
1 material in a large developed nation not containing hostile domestic forces. “Hostile 
domestic forces” refers to any adversary presence within the country that regularly 
carries out guerilla or terrorist attacks. Because the state assumed for this thesis is a 
developed nation without domestic sources of attackers, the adversary is limited to an 
attack force size that would not be noticed passing through and training within the 
country. Possession of Category 1 material, in this case significant quantities of HEU, 
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means the facilities are within the top grade of a graded DBT. Based on these conditions, 
the baseline adversary force was designed to be a cell of foreign terrorists with access to 
military equipment and moderate levels of combat experience or training. A breakdown 
of how their capabilities translate into force multipliers and the total effective force value 
can be found in Table I. 
 
TABLE I 
Force Multipliers and Characteristics of the Baseline DBT 
Characteristic Multiplier
Actual # 8
Cover 1
Experience 1.5
Insider 1
Weapon 3
Grenades 1
Effective Force 36
No LAW Capability  
  
The overall adversary force size of 8 represents two squads working together, but 
they possess the training to split up and attack different targets in Scenarios 3 and 4. 
They are given a 1.5x multiplier for experience based on previous small-arms and 
tactical training at a jihadi camp, which is considered equivalent to basic military 
training. While enough passive insider information is known by the adversary to enable 
them to determine the best route to the target, they are not given credit for knowing 
information about the response force or defensive positions, and therefore do not receive 
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the insider multiplier.  A weapons multiplier of 3x represents standard military 
equipment such as assault rifles and optics, but not an expert level of proficiency. While 
in possession of breaching explosives and tools, the adversary does not possess area kill 
weapons such as grenades, suicide vests, or antitank weaponry. Light antitank weaponry 
would not directly increase the effective force of the adversary, but would reduce the 
response force’s cover multiplier. Similar tables are provided for the perturbed cases in 
Section 3, highlighting which DBT characteristics have been altered. 
 While not a part of the DBT, the response force’s characteristics are provided in 
Table II. Each scenario is based on the same response force, with minor variations in the 
cover multiplier for certain scenarios. In scenarios with fixed facilities the cover 
multiplier is 3x, with a reduction to 2x in scenarios where the target is mobile. The cover 
multiplier is also reduced when the adversary possesses LAW capability. 
 
TABLE II   
Force Multipliers Used for the Response Force 
Characteristic Multiplier
Actual # 4
Cover* 3
Experience 2
Insider N/A
Weapon 5
Grenades N/A
Effective Force 120  
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 While the total number of response force personnel at each facility is higher than 
four, only a single squad will be deployed to prevent diversion attacks from 
compromising security (each attack faces a four-man response force squad). This 
assumption was made based on each facility possessing several targets that could be 
attacked, where full deployment to one target would result in the other targets being 
undefended. As mentioned above, the response force receives a significant cover 
multiplier of 3x when defending from fortified positions and 2x when fighting from 
armored vehicles. Based on typical response forces in the United States, the operators 
are equipped with high quality military gear and possess the weapons training necessary 
to achieve top performance. Combined with Special Forces equivalent experience, the 
response force is given the maximum multiplier for both experience and weaponry. 
While response force personnel are often equipped with grenades, we assumed the 
response force was more limited in area kill weaponry than an attacker with suicide vest 
capabilities; this assumption was represented by removing the response force’s grenade 
multiplier. It was also assumed that any inside information the state possessed on the 
adversary would be used for counter-terrorism rather than playing a role in individual 
facility attacks. Any scenario deviation from the response force characteristics in Table 
II is defined under that scenario’s characterization. 
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2.3 Facility and Scenario Characterization 
 Four scenarios, involving three modeled facilities, were used to determine the 
effects of DBT variations on physical security performance. The first two facilities are 
stationary sites that store Category 1 material, whereas the third facility is an armored 
transport carrying nuclear weapons components. The general layout, security levels, and 
delay/detection mechanics are summarized for each scenario below. A more in-depth 
description of each facility is located in the Appendix, should the reader desire to 
recreate the facility for further testing. 
 Rather than physically modeling the structures in each facility, as is done for 
more sophisticated studies with software such as JCATS, an ASD with explicitly defined 
detection and delay measures was constructed for each facility using Sandia’s SAVI 
program. As noted in the Section 2.1.2, the Facility module is used to create the ASD 
and the Outsider module tests a defined adversary against this ASD. 
2.3.1 Facility One – Scenario One 
 The first facility is a 2x2 mile site in which the initial construction was assumed 
to have not focused heavily on security against 21st century threats. Standard security 
features such as detectors and reinforced walls exist, but the overall building and road 
arrangement was designed for ease of use rather than to maximize delay or detection 
opportunities. There are several vulnerable points, such as an air duct large enough for 
human transit, which would not be present in a newly constructed facility. Each 
perceived vulnerable point has been reinforced with additional delay and detection 
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components, but the vulnerable points were not physically removed. The full facility 
layout is given in Fig. 3 with security level designations shown. The general layout was 
taken from a section of an existing nuclear facility, but security layers, actual distances, 
and the target building itself were fabricated for this thesis. 
 
 
Fig. 3. Exterior image of Facility One with security level labels. 
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 The ASD breaks the facility down into several security layers: Offsite, Limited 
Area, Protected Area, Controlled Building, Controlled Room, Target Area, and Target. 
Both the Limited Area and the Protected Area can be traversed by vehicle, but use of a 
vehicle requires special identification in inner layers. The various elements that can be 
defeated to cross from one layer to another are shown in the ASD given as Fig. 4.  
 
Fig. 4. Adversary sequence diagram for Facility One. 
 
 Security elements separating the Offsite and Limited Areas are meant to 
designate the property boundary and control the flow of traffic rather than to detect 
covert adversaries. There are two vehicle entrances and a pedestrian portal into the 
Limited Area that possess limited contraband detection capabilities. The first real 
detection opportunities occur within the Limited Area when an adversary attempts to 
cross into the Protected Area. The Protected Area is surrounded by double fences with a 
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central isolation zone possessing multiple detector systems and is crossed by a site 
vehicle portal, shipping and receiving gate, and a personnel portal. This set of portals is 
equipped with the capability to detect explosives, and all personnel and cargo are 
subjected to searches. The target building can be entered conventionally in the Protected 
Area either through a personnel portal or the shipping and receiving portal, both 
equipped with sophisticated contraband detection systems. With the use of breaching 
equipment, the building can be entered through a set of office windows, a ventilation 
duct, several walls, or the ceiling. The interior of the target building is broken into 
several security layers shown in Fig. 5. The target is protected by a security glass cage 
within a secured vault in the Target Area behind the front offices. 
 
Fig. 5. Interior security levels of Facility 1’s target building. 
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 The second facility is a 500x500m controlled area within a larger property 
protection area. The overall site represents a large government industrial complex with 
significant pedestrian and vehicle traffic outside the various limited areas. Security 
features in the property protection area are focused on controlling traffic and responding 
to emergencies rather than detecting a covert adversary force, so the first detection 
opportunities in this simulation will occur when crossing into the Limited Area. The 
only vehicles with access to this facility must take a shipping/receiving road which 
wraps around the Protected Area to increase delay. This can be seen in Fig. 6 which 
breaks the facility into various exterior security levels. 
 
Fig. 6. Exterior security layers of the second simulated facility.   
2.3.2 Facility Two – Scenario Two 
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The ASD for Facility Two splits the layout into a series of security layers: the 
Property Protection Area, Limited Areas (one to represent use of a vehicle on the 
shipment route and the second representing travel along the pedestrian path by foot), 
Protected Area, Material Access Area, Target Building, Radiation Area, Target Area, 
and the Target. As with Facility One, there are several different elements that can be 
defeated at each phase to cross to the next layer. These elements and their corresponding 
layers are shown in Fig. 7. 
 
 
Fig. 7. ASD showing the security elements and layers of Facility Two. 
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 Standard employee traffic into the limited area is through the main personnel 
portal with site and shipment vehicles passing through a vehicle portal (civilian vehicles 
are prohibited). All packages and cargo must be brought through the vehicle portal 
where they undergo a thorough search. A second set of portals allows passage through 
the Perimeter Intrusion Detection and Assessment System (PIDAS) that surrounds the 
Protected Area. These portals have more comprehensive contraband detection systems 
designed to prevent explosives from entering the more highly controlled sections of the 
facility. Passage into the Material Access Area is limited to a single personnel portal 
where employees are screened for material that could be used to smuggle HEU out of the 
facility. The target building is located within the Material Access Area, and its interior is 
broken into the security sections shown in Fig. 8. The entrance portal possesses the same 
detection measures as the Material Access Portal, but also screens for radiological 
material on personnel leaving the building. A security portal separates the laboratories 
that deal with minor sources from the vault containing fissile material and the two 
laboratory spaces that handle the material. Only those personnel with special clearance 
are allowed beyond this point. The target is located within a wire mesh cage in the vault. 
Access to the vault requires two trained workers who must contact the central alarm 
station (CAS) upon entry and exit. 
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Fig. 8. Interior layout of Facility Two’s target building. 
 
2.3.3 Facility Three – Scenarios Three and Four 
 The third facility represents a series of armored convoys consisting of one real 
transport, two decoys transports, and response force personnel protecting each transport. 
Each convoy is geographically separated so that a single group of attackers can only 
strike one transport. Both scenarios begin with an adversary ambush. In Scenario Three 
the ambush succeeds in only stopping the convoy while in Scenario Four the response 
force is immediately reduced to half capability. There are three cases for each scenario 
based on how the adversary chooses to divide their capabilities. The first case uses the 
adversary’s full capabilities against a single convoy, but the adversary only has a 33% 
chance of attacking the correct target. The second case involves attacks on two convoys 
at half capability (PA = 67%), and in the third case, all convoys are attacked with a one-
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third capability (PA = 100%). Because response force personnel and the transport drivers 
are not told which convoy contains the actual material, any insider information the 
adversary receives is related to delay elements and response force tactics rather than 
revealing which transports are decoys. 
 Unlike in the previous scenarios, the response force in the transport scenarios (3 
and 4) engages the adversary before the adversary attempts to reach the target. The 
purpose of delay elements in this case is to allow a secondary response force to arrive 
should the first set of defenders be defeated. In this thesis the secondary response force 
will not be defined. It is assumed to be overwhelming and capable of arriving within the 
delay time of the original DBT. For the transport facility, PI was set to 100% with PA and 
PN changing based on the adversary capability perturbations. 
 Because the response force uses armored vehicles instead of fortified positions, 
the base cover multiplier received is reduced from 3x to 2x and is fully removed if the 
adversary possesses LAW capabilities. The adversary force is also allowed vehicle-
based improvised explosive devices (VBIED) for the attacks on Facility Three. Both 
scenarios are initiated with the VBIED, the VBIED’s effect being the only difference 
between Scenario 3 and 4. In Scenario 3 the VBIED succeeds in stopping the convoy, 
while in Scenario 4 it also eliminates half of the response force. 
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3.  ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
 
The original strictly defined DBT, shown again in Table III, served as a test case 
to calibrate the physical security systems of each facility. We tweaked detection and 
delay elements until each facility’s risk factor against this DBT was below 0.2. We 
decided a rational adversary would not consider an attack with a chance of success 
below 20% to be cost effective (considering the enormous costs of attacking a high 
security facility). After the initial security modifications to reach the target risk values, 
the physical security systems at each facility were kept constant. The PN, PI, response 
force time (RFT), and overall risk for each facility against the original DBT are given in 
Table IV (Scenarios 3 and 4 assume only a single attack with PA equal to 33%). The 
effects of perturbing each adversary capability were tested separately (with the exception 
of explosives and LAW capability) to determine which are most important to correctly 
define when using a strictly defined DBT. 
TABLE III  
DBT Used to Design the Physical Security Systems 
Characteristic Multiplier
Actual # 8
Cover 1
Experience 1.5
Insider 1
Weapon 3
Grenades 1
Effective Force 36
No LAW Capability  
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TABLE IV 
Risk Equation Parameters Calculated with Original DBT 
Scenario PI PN PA RFT(s) Risk
1 98.26% 90.08% 100.00% 150 0.115
2 97.70% 90.07% 100.00% 300 0.120
3 100.00% 64.19% 33.33% 0 0.119
4 100.00% 40.16% 33.33% 0 0.199  
 
3.1 DBT Characteristic Sensitivities 
 The results of each perturbation of the original DBT will be discussed 
individually, followed by a summary of which adversary characteristics produce the 
greatest shifts in security system performance and how the perturbation effects varied 
from facility to facility. To ensure the perturbations would be comparable, deviations 
from the DBT were mostly limited to small perturbations. 
3.1.1 Probability of Neutralization (PN) Sensitivities 
 Many of the DBT characteristics only play a role in determining PN since they do 
not change the adversary’s pathway. These characteristics include the number of 
attackers, their levels of combat training and experience, insider information about the 
response force, and the type and proficiency of weaponry used.  
Changes in these characteristics can also affect which tactics the adversary group 
uses when multiple targets exist. A larger group of adversaries has the option of splitting 
into several groups to strike multiple targets simultaneously or conduct an initial 
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diversionary attack to misdirect the response force. While Scenarios 1 and 2 were 
limited to an attack on a single target, the adversary’s capability to defeat the response in 
Scenarios 3 and 4 determined whether it was more effective to strike at one target or 
split into groups to hit two or three targets. In the following risk tables, Scenarios 3 and 4 
are assessed under three different attack plans: “a” represents a single attack at full 
capacity, “b” represents an attack on two targets simultaneously at half capability, and 
“c” represents attacks on all three targets at one-third capability.  
TABLE V 
Characteristics of DBT Perturbation Featuring Increased Weapons Capability  
Characteristic Multiplier
Actual # 8
Cover 1
Experience 1.5
Insider 1
Weapon 5
Grenades 1
Effective Force 60
LAW Capability
  
TABLE VI 
Facility Risk with DBT Perturbation Featuring Increased Weapons Capability 
Scenario Risk
1 0.263
2 0.267
3 a 0.180
3 b 0.194
3 c 0.157
4 a 0.245
4 b 0.360
4 c 0.397  
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The following pages display how various perturbations changed the adversary’s 
effective force and how this revised force affected the risk level for each scenario. In 
each of these perturbations, the increase (or decrease) in effective force directly changed 
PN. Tables V and VI present the effects of the first DBT perturbation, an increase to full 
weapon capability.  Tables VII and VIII show the results of a small increase in the 
number of attackers.  Tables IX and X  involve a reduction in adversary capability (two 
fewer attackers).  Tables XI and XII feature greatly heightened adversary capabilities 
based on maximum adversary experience, insider assistance, and weaponry. 
TABLE VII 
Characteristics of DBT Perturbation with Two Additional Attackers 
Characteristic Multiplier
Actual # 10
Cover 1
Experience 1.5
Insider 1
Weapon 3
Grenades 1
Effective Force 45
LAW Capability
 
TABLE VIII 
Facility Risk with DBT Perturbation of Two Additional Attackers 
Scenario Risk
1 0.172
2 0.177
3 a 0.147
3 b 0.129
3 c 0.085
4 a 0.221
4 b 0.293
4 c 0.292  
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TABLE IX 
Characteristics of DBT Perturbation with Two Fewer Attackers 
Characteristic Multiplier
Actual # 6
Cover 1
Experience 1.5
Insider 1
Weapon 3
Grenades 1
Effective Force 27
LAW Capability
 
TABLE X 
Facility Risk with DBT Perturbation of Two Fewer Attackers 
Scenario Risk
1 0.063
2 0.068
3 a 0.085
3 b 0.043
3 c 0.016
4 a 0.168
4 b 0.170
4 c 0.128  
TABLE XI 
Characteristics of DBT Perturbation Featuring Greatly Heightened Combat Capabilities 
Characteristic Multiplier
Actual # 8
Cover 1
Experience 2
Insider 1.5
Weapon 5
Grenades 1
Effective Force 120
LAW Capability
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TABLE XII 
Facility Risk with DBT Perturbation Featuring Greatly Heightened Combat Capabilities 
Scenario Risk
1 0.509
2 0.512
3 a 0.245
3 b 0.360
3 c 0.397
4 a 0.286
4 b 0.490
4 c 0.630  
 
 These tables show how perturbations in adversary numbers and weaponry 
produce proportional changes to facility risk. An interesting observation in Scenarios 3 
and 4 is the effectiveness of the adversary splitting into groups to strike at multiple 
targets. Since each target is protected by an equal number of response force operators, 
this tactic results in the adversary effectively fighting three times as many combatants. 
Despite the response force now having a better chance to win each engagement, the 
increased odds of attacking the correct convoy outweigh the disadvantages from the 
increased PN. The exception to this trend occurs when the adversary will win an 
engagement less than 18% of the time (PN > 82%), as was the case in Scenario 3c in 
Table VI. The adversary’s best tactic for hijacking nuclear material in transit (when 
decoys are present) is to attack as many targets as possible until the point where the 
response force possesses an overwhelming advantage. In the case where the adversary 
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possesses the highest capabilities, shown in Table XII, the facility risk value is more 
than doubled in Scenario 4 when the adversary splits into three groups. 
3.1.2 Probability of Interception Sensitivities 
The only tested force multiplier that affected both PI and PN was the inclusion of 
non-breaching explosives such as grenades, suicide vests, and anti-tank weaponry. The 
direct advantage gained over the response force is represented in the “Grenades” force 
multiplier while the ability to quickly puncture fortified positions both lowers the 
response force’s cover multiplier and reduces the delay values of guard towers. The 
perturbed force multipliers are shown in Table XIII, with the results of adding LAW and 
explosives shown in Table XIV. 
 
TABLE XIII 
Characteristics of DBT Perturbation with Increased Explosives Capability 
Characteristic Multiplier
Actual # 8
Cover 1
Experience 1.5
Insider 1
Weapon 3
Grenades 2
Effective Force 72
LAW Capability  
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TABLE XIV 
Facility Risk with DBT Perturbation of Increased Explosives Capability 
Scenario Risk
1 0.935
2 0.609
3 a 0.258
3 b 0.399
3 c 0.463
4 a 0.293
4 b 0.516
4 c 0.680  
 
Despite the adversary possessing a lower effective force than is seen in Table XI 
and 12, LAW capability opened new pathways in Scenarios 1 and 2 which greatly 
increased risk. Accounting for the reduction in the response force’s cover multiplier (due 
to the added LAW capability), the effective force ratio between the case in Table XII 
and Table XIV are similar, as can be seen with Scenarios 3 and 4. Facility 1 proved 
particularly sensitive to the adversary acquiring LAW capability due to its reliance on 
small arms resistant guard posts (risk increased by a factor of 8), whereas Facility 2 was 
slightly more resistant (risk increased by a factor of 4).  
It is possible for some adversary capabilities to affect the response force 
deployment time (RFT), which alters PI instead of PN. There are several factors that can 
increase the RFT, but these factors were modeled together as a series of three 15-sec 
increases in RFT. Capabilities that would modify the response time include having an 
active insider who misdirects the response force (such as an alarm station operator or a 
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ranking member of the response force), utilizing a tactic such as a form of diversion or 
subterfuge to limit the response force’s ability to correctly deploy, or using radio 
jamming equipment to interfere with the response force’s ability to communicate and 
receive updates. We modeled these conditions by changing the RFT parameter in the 
Outsider module of SAVI. The results of RFT perturbations on Scenarios 1 and 2 are 
given in Tables XV and XVI. The sensitivity to adversary capabilities that interfere with 
RFT proved highly dependent on the facility and its corresponding ASD. The critical 
detection point (CDP) will not change when a facility is designed with a conservative 
buffer (a large time remaining after the predicted interception point (TRI)). However 
when the TRI is small, a slight delay in RFT will push back the CDP. The rapid loss in 
system performance when the CDP changes is evident in Scenario 1; the first CDP shift 
lowers PI from 98.26% to 9.50%. A change in the CDP does not always result in such a 
large performance penalty. There are four CDP shifts in Scenario 2 as the RFT is varied 
from 285s to 330s, but it is not until the last shift that PI drops to an unacceptable level. 
 
TABLE XV 
Scenario 1’s PI and TRI as a Function of RFT 
RFT (s) TRI (s) PI
120 92 98.26%
135 77 98.26%
150 62 98.26%
165 12 98.26%
180 4 9.50%
195 N/A 0.00%  
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TABLE XVI 
Scenario 2’s PI and TRI as a Function of RFT 
RFT (s) TRI (s) PI
270 27 97.75%
285 12 97.75%
300 4 97.70%
315 5 95.62%
330 33 14.40%
345 18 14.40%  
 
The final case for testing DBT perturbations allowed the adversary to possess 
false credentials, facility uniforms, and key cards. All previous cases were performed 
under the assumption that the adversary would attempt stealth oriented tactics until the 
CDP, then proceed along the pathway of minimum delay. Modern identification cards 
are very difficult to falsify or replicate when equipped with ID microchips and standard 
policy is to deactivate any cards the moment they are reported stolen or lost. The 
repercussions can be severe if the adversary is capable of acquiring fake identification 
that unlocks doors. A comparison of facility risk with and without the adversary 
efficiently using deceit based tactics can be found in Table XVII. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 43 
TABLE XVII 
Risk Values against Adversary Successfully Utilizing Deceitful Tactics 
PI PN R PI PN R
Terrorist w/o Deceit 98.26% 90.08% 0.115 97.70% 90.08% 0.120
Terrorist w/ Deceit 19.00% 90.08% 0.829 81.92% 90.08% 0.262
Criminal w/ Deceit 19.00% 98.36% 0.813 81.92% 98.36% 0.194
Adversary and Tactic 
Definiton
Scenario 1 Scenario 2
 
 
To simulate an adversary possessing false credentials and identification badges, 
we changed the adversary strategy in the Outsider module of SAVI from “Force/Stealth 
Only” to “Force/Stealth/Deceit”. Three values of risk for the first two scenarios are 
given in Table XVII. The first adversary definition was the previously defined original 
DBT without false credentials, the second was the adversary with deceit capabilities, and 
the third was the adversary using deceit and reduced numbers. The reduced force 
multipliers of the third set reflect a small criminal group rather than a small force of 
terrorists (multipliers are listed in Table XVIII). We assumed the criminal threat to 
possess three outsiders supported by at least one insider. In this case the insider provided 
the information necessary for the outsiders to efficiently practice deceit. The second 
definition is fairly unrealistic; a large group of commandos would not be able to pose as 
facility employees while staying together. The main focus of the table is between the 
terrorist definition without deceit and the criminal definition with deceit. Because 
Facility 1 is a civilian oriented site (originally built with ease of transit in mind rather 
than security) with security features added later in its life, it is highly sensitive to 
capabilities that could bypass security locks. Facility 2’s intrinsic delay features 
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(winding roads and corridors to maximize delay and detection) provide a relatively high 
resistance to the deceit capabilities that easily defeated Facility 1. 
 
TABLE XVIII 
Criminal Adversary’s Force Multipliers 
Characteristic Multiplier
Actual # 3
Cover 1
Experience 1.5
Insider 1.5
Weapon 3
Grenades 1
Effective Force 20.25
No LAW Capability  
3.1.3 DBT Characteristic Sensitivity Summary 
 It is easy to predict how a facility’s risk will change with perturbations of combat 
related capabilities (those that affect only PN) in cases where the adversary focuses all 
their capabilities against a single target. The sensitivity to adversary combat capabilities 
is dependent on the effective response force value. Small shifts in adversary capability 
have the largest effect when the effective response-force-to-adversary-ratio (R/A) is 
close to one. When security is designed so that R/A is further along the PN curve (Fig. 9), 
there is reduced security system sensitivity to small shifts in adversary capability. While 
each facility possesses unique characteristics that altered the effective response force 
value, the sensitivity to adversary combat capability is facility independent when looking 
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at R/A. The exception is when multiple targets are present. As long as the response force 
does not possesses an overwhelming force advantage (PN > 82%), it is in the adversary’s 
best interest to strike multiple targets. The slight disadvantage the adversary takes by 
increasing the R/A ratio is offset by the linear increase in PA when only one target is real. 
The same is true when considering multiple real targets that would increase consequence 
linearly rather than PA. 
 
 
Fig. 9. Probability of neutralization as a function of the effective response force (R) 
divided by the effective adversary force (A). 
  
 Sensitivity to any capability that affects PI is highly dependent on facility 
characteristics. These capabilities normally change the delay values of various security 
elements which can significantly impact the overall facility risk if the CDP changes. The 
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same is true for any capability that increases the RFT in that there is minimal effect until 
the CDP shifts, but risk can increase rapidly afterwards.  
Based on the results of Scenarios 1 and 2, facility physical security systems are 
highly sensitive to perturbations of adversary capabilities that affect PI compared to 
capabilities that only affect PN. To further illustrate this point, Table XIX compares the 
change in risk associated with the greatest increase in combat exclusive capabilities 
(maxed adversary experience, insider support, and weaponry quality/proficiency) to an 
adversary possessing explosive capabilities. While effective adversary force is much 
higher when combat capabilities are increased, the R/A ratio for both cases are similar 
(explosives capability reduced the response forces cover multiplier). Even with similar 
R/A ratios, the risk value for the adversary with explosives was significantly higher due 
to a shift in the CDP. Because interception is guaranteed in Scenarios 3 and 4, risk is 
similar for both capabilities because of their R/A ratios. 
 
TABLE XIX 
Comparison between Explosives and Advanced Weaponry/Training 
Scenario
Weapon 
Risk
Explosive 
Risk
1 0.509 0.935
2 0.512 0.609
3 a 0.245 0.258
3 b 0.360 0.399
3 c 0.397 0.463
4 a 0.286 0.293
4 b 0.490 0.516
4 c 0.630 0.680  
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The sensitivity to capabilities that enable the adversary to successfully execute 
tactics that utilize deceit, normally a combination of insider support and false 
credentials, also varies based on each facility’s features. Facility 1’s PI dropped to 19% 
when the adversary used deceit as a tactic compared to Facility 2’s PI of 81.92%. 
3.2 Methods to Limit Perturbation Sensitivity 
 The high sensitivity to changes in adversary capabilities that affect PI resulted 
from how these changes affected the critical detection point (CDP). Extra conservatism 
can be placed into the security system’s design to provide a buffer against CDP shifts. 
As mentioned above, each completed ASD (after attackers and CDP have been defined) 
contains an associated time remaining after interception (TRI). If a perturbation in the 
DBT’s adversary capabilities reduces delay or increases RFT by less than TRI, the CDP 
and the facility’s calculated security risk do not change. It is important to note that a 
conservatively large TRI does not protect against adversary capability changes that 
reduce the probability of detecting the adversary (such as deceit). If the chance to detect 
the adversary is reduced, risk will increase whether or not the CDP changes. 
 The best way to protect against adversary capabilities that can spoof or fool 
detection measures is to enhance the implementation of detection systems. Mixing 
different types of complementary detectors (one detector accounts for the other’s weak 
points) forces the adversary to perform more difficult maneuvers and invest significant 
amounts of time. Examples of this practice include combining volumetric microwave 
detectors with infrared motion detectors in an isolation zone or adding biometric locks to 
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complement badge readers in high security areas. The complementary detection systems 
should be geographically focused prior to the CDP to ensure the response force has time 
to respond after detection and assessment.  
 When financial or resource constraints limit the amount of conservatism that can 
be built into the security system, it can be desirable to shift resources away from system 
components that deal with low-sensitivity threat capabilities. This step is more practical 
when the facility is still at the design stages rather than having facility operators 
physically remove existing system elements. There is still some value to removing 
unnecessary security features after facility construction is complete if it lowers upkeep 
costs, but it would still be better to catch unnecessary elements during the design phase. 
For example, the resources associated with construction of a reinforced fighting position 
or hiring additional response force personnel would be better allocated to improving 
delay and detection measures if the system is already resistant to adversary capabilities 
that affect PN (on the upper end of the PN curve in Fig. 9). 
 Instead of strictly defining a balanced set of threat capabilities for each DBT 
grade, defining adversary capabilities as a range can reduce the sensitivity of a facility 
security system to DBT changes. With a flexible range of capabilities, several different 
types of adversaries would be tested against each facility’s security system. However, 
simultaneously increasing all adversary capabilities to conservative levels would result 
in an unrealistic amalgamation. Protecting against this unrealistic threat would be 
unreasonably expensive and a waste of resources. A flexible DBT means the physical 
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security system must be capable of defeating adversaries with military explosives or 
high quality spoofing measures, but not an adversary with both capabilities.  
3.3 Point Based DBT 
 Rather than implement upgrades or additional flexibility to a strictly defined 
DBT system, a more efficient approach to addressing security system sensitivity to DBT 
perturbations could be to use a point-based DBT. A point-based DBT is similar to 
having a unique DBT for each facility, even though facilities are still divided into 
different categories or grades. To reduce the strain of using a more sophisticated DBT, 
the competent authority (the main government agency responsible for nuclear security) 
is assisted by an in-house vulnerability assessment team at each facility. Under this 
point-based system, the different adversary characteristics are given weighted factors or 
point costs that reflect the difficulties the adversary would face in developing that 
capability. The point cost would reflect the difficulty in avoiding government attention, 
at both local and federal levels, as well as the financial burden.  In a fully developed 
model, capability point costs would vary across the state based on local conditions. As 
the facilities used in this thesis are hypothetical, local environmental conditions have 
been ignored. Development of the point costs for each capability would require input 
from the state’s intelligence community and local law enforcement to establish the 
difficulty in covertly developing each capability within the state.  
 The proposed point-based DBT is similar to a graded DBT in that facilities are 
split into groups based on the consequence of a successful adversary action. Rather than 
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sharing DBT characteristics however, each group would share a total point-cap. Points 
would then be allocated into different sets of threat capabilities to develop several sets of 
possible adversaries. The facility grouping, total point-cap, and capability point costs 
would be determined by the state’s competent authority while scenario development and 
tweaking of point costs based on local factors would be handled by the facility’s 
vulnerability assessment team. The intent of analyzing a range of threat capabilities in 
this fashion is to discover unexpected security system vulnerabilities that could be 
missed when using a strictly defined DBT. Tested scenarios should cover a large range 
of possibilities based on the perceived capabilities of existing adversaries, predicted 
future capabilities, and historical events (not limited to attacks on nuclear assets). After 
successfully developing, testing, and defeating a range of scenarios, the vulnerability 
assessment staff would report findings and recommendations back to the competent 
authority.  
 To demonstrate how this process would be performed, we generated a set of 
capability point costs and used them to develop scenarios for the first two facilities 
employed earlier in this study. While investigations into the merits of a point-based 
system are already being performed at several facilities in the United States, we decided 
on the exact breakdown of capabilities and assignment of point values for this thesis’s 
point system without input from any federal agency to ensure the work remains open-
source. The point based DBT will be discussed in the following order: how the point 
cost assignments were devised, development of several adversary groups, analysis of the 
point based DBT on the first two facilities, historical events that could be used to 
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validate point costs, and a summary discussion of the author’s initial conclusion of the 
costs versus benefits of implementing a point-based system. 
3.3.1 Capability Cost Development 
 The different types of threat capabilities considered in the point-based DBT were 
carried over from the breakdown of capabilities used in the previous strictly defined 
DBT. Point costs for each capability were assigned based on the assumed ability of the 
adversary to procure, develop, and train covertly. In order to estimate the difficulty 
associated with these covert activities, it is necessary to further define the host state. The 
state’s size, political stability, presence of hostile domestic actors, black market 
activities, freedom of citizens to acquire munitions, and a host of other characteristics all 
affect the difficulty an adversary would face in developing each capability.  
In this thesis the state is defined as a developed democracy of considerable size 
that possesses efficient intelligence and law enforcement abilities. Small anti-
government elements exist along the fringe of the state’s society, but they lack the 
motivation required to act and are under government scrutiny. The lack of hostile 
domestic forces means it is difficult for the adversary to recruit and train large numbers 
of fighters covertly. Gun laws are slightly stricter than those found in the United States; 
civilians are allowed to possess hunting rifles, but not military type weaponry or 
handguns. Because the state has a free economy, black market and organized crime 
activities are minimal. Explosives and military equipment are both expensive and 
difficult to obtain. These factors went into the capability point costs seen in Table XX. 
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TABLE XX 
Sample Capability Point Costs 
n x 10  (n ≤ 6)
n x 12  (n > 6)
None 0 1
Basic n x 2 1.5
Spec Ops n x 5 2
Insider Passive 50 1.5
1 0 1
2 n x 1 2
3 n x 3 3
4 n x 8 4
5 n x 10 5
Grenades n x 5 2
LAW 50 *
Fake ID n x 20 + 50 **
Jamming 20 ***
* Reduces RF Cover and SI Post Delay Times           
** Allows Deceit as a Tactic                                         
*** Increases RFT by 30s
Weaponry 
Quality and 
Profiency 
Training
Explosive 
Weapons
Counter 
Measures
Number of 
Attackers (n)
1-12
Tactical 
Training and 
Experience
Force 
Multiplier
n
Allowed 
Range
Capability Point Cost
 
  
Training a larger group of attackers comes with a slight increase in cost due to 
their increased training footprint. The more attackers involved, the more likely the state 
will become aware of their activities. Training equivalent to a military’s boot camp was 
set to a low cost since it can easily be disguised as survival or hunting training whereas 
Special Operations equivalent training would require a trainer who already possessed 
this level of military skill. While the financial cost of obtaining an insider has not 
historically been high, it is difficult to attempt recruitment covertly. Weaponry 
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multipliers have again been broken into five categories. The first three represent varying 
degrees of expertise with legal weapons (hunting rifles in the thesis’s state) while the last 
two categories are illegal military equipment. Explosive weaponry is split into two 
categories since the number of grenades (a placeholder for any antipersonnel explosive) 
equipped varies with the number of attackers whereas only a single antitank (AT)  
launcher is needed to eliminate an armored position. The fake identification capability 
includes false credentials that can open locked doors and facility uniforms. In addition to 
the cost per attacker, there is also the added cost of obtaining an insider who can provide 
site material to counterfeit. Jamming equipment represents any device that disrupts radio 
or signal communications to the response force. All of these costs can vary based on 
local conditions, and their initial definition is likely to be a time consuming process for 
the responsible authorities. 
3.3.2 Scenario Development and Analysis 
 The total point cap that limits the possible adversary definitions was set to the 
original strictly defined graded DBT’s point cost. Based on the capability costs in Table 
XX, the total point cap was computed as 136 and set to 140. With the total point cap in 
place, a set of adversary definitions was developed that would ensure each sensitive 
adversary capability (as determined in Section 3.1.3) was tested at least once. 
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In addition to the original DBT, adversary definitions added with the point-based 
system include: 
 Two attackers with basic training, weapon multiplier of 3, fake identification, 
and jamming equipment (140 pts), 
 Four attackers with SF training, weapon multiplier of 5, grenades, and jamming 
equipment (140 pts), and 
 Four attackers with basic training, weapon multiplier of 3, grenades, and AT 
capability (130 pts). 
This adversary set included the base definition and the three capabilities that altered 
PI (jamming equipment, false identification, and AT weapons). The resulting security 
risk value of each attack can be found below in the order they were presented (with the 
original DBT coming first). 
 
TABLE XXI 
Scenario Risk against Original DBT 
Scenario Risk
1 0.115
2 0.120
3 a 0.119
3 b 0.086
3 c 0.046
4 a 0.199
4 b 0.239
4 c 0.214  
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TABLE XXII 
Scenario Risk against Criminal Adversary Practicing Deceit 
Scenario Risk
1 0.540
2 0.121
3 a 0.001
3 b 0.000
3 c N/A
4 a 0.015
4 b 0.001
4 c N/A  
TABLE XXIII 
Scenario Risk against Adversary with Maximum Combat Multipliers 
Scenario Risk
1 0.365
2 0.382
3 a 0.210
3 b 0.265
3 c 0.250
4 a 0.265
4 b 0.420
4 c 0.500  
TABLE XXIV 
Scenario Risk against Adversary with AT Capability 
Scenario Risk
1 0.914
2 0.485
3 a 0.199
3 b 0.239
3 c 0.214
4 a 0.258
4 b 0.399
4 c 0.463  
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 The various adversaries designed with the point-based system produced similar 
results to those shown in Section 3.1. These results show that while the original DBT 
appears to be a realistic threat with a balance of capabilities, it results in a false sense of 
security. A specialized adversary that focuses on one particular strategy proved more 
effective against each facility. 
 The criminal adversary attempting to avoid confrontation proved highly effective 
against the first facility (Table XXII). This would be important for security designers to 
learn before the facility’s security system was established since the insider threat has 
historically been the most common attacker. There have been numerous cases of insiders 
stealing material in Eastern Europe after the fall of the Soviet Union that were uncovered 
only after forensics was performed on stolen material. Facility Two proved highly 
resistant to the insider threat based on the previously mentioned passive delay elements 
and general site layout. In this case, vulnerability assessment team members could shift 
resources whose original purpose was insider resistance to address other vulnerabilities. 
This benefit is more practical when the facility’s physical security system is still in the 
design phase; however, savings could still be found by, say, reducing the scope of a 
human reliability program (HRP). Enrollment in an HRP is meant to reduce the risk of 
insiders and can involve time consuming tests such as polygraphs. By mitigating the 
consequences of an insider with other security measures, the need for HRP clearance can 
be reduced. 
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 An adversary with reduced numbers and maximum combat multipliers proved 
more effective against each facility than the original DBT (Table XXIII). Facility Three 
was particularly vulnerable to this threat. By maximizing effective force, the adversary 
was able to efficiently attack multiple convoys in both Scenarios 3 and 4. While it is still 
beneficial to use decoy convoys in Scenario 3, the decoys made a much smaller 
difference in this case than when used against the original DBT (Table XXI). 
 Despite having a slightly lower point cost, an adversary equipped with AT 
weaponry produced the highest risk level in the first two facilities. Vulnerability 
assessment personnel could reduce this risk by strengthening some of the guard posts, 
pushing explosives detection from the inner security levels to the outer security levels, or 
reducing the reliance on guard posts as a form of delay. 
  Examining this set of scenarios revealed vulnerabilities in the physical security 
systems that were missed when using only the original DBT. Additional measures to 
mitigate the insider threat in Facility 1 (Table XXII) and a reduced reliance on small-
arms resistant portals for Facilities 1 and 2 (Table XXIV) would help balance risk across 
the range of possible threats. A vulnerability assessment team would recognize this fact 
when using the point-based system, and they could report the results and improvements 
back to the state’s competent authority. 
3.3.3 Verifying Point Costs with Historic Events 
 An effective method to verify point costs and caps, or even initially determine 
their values, is to apply the point-based system to historic events that still have 
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relevance. Since most countries have not experienced physical assaults on their nuclear 
assets, it is necessary to expand the scope of historic events to include terrorist attacks on 
any large or high value target. Historical precedents exist for the full range of adversary 
capabilities considered in most DBTs. A selection of events that could be used for this 
purpose is discussed below based on the capabilities used by the attacking groups. At the 
time we wrote this thesis, fairly accurate summaries of each of the following events 
could be found at Wikipedia. Though encyclopedias are not the best place for 
authoritative facts, the exact numbers related to most of these events are not available in 
open literature and estimates tabulated from new stories and press reports served our 
purpose.  
 When it comes to setting the overall point cap, several different terrorist events in 
Russia display some of the highest numbers of well-equipped adversaries outside of 
military engagements. The 2002 Nord-Ost siege14 and the Beslan massacre15 stand out in 
particular due the same terrorist organization using a large number of attackers equipped 
with military weaponry.14,15 Consisting of more than 30 combatants with military 
experience in the Second Chechen War and military grade weapons and explosives, 
Riyadus-Salikhin (the Chechen terrorist group) more than tripled what is commonly used 
as a DBT. These events would serve as good upper limits to a point cap for a state that 
does not possess the intelligence capability to uncover large operations beforehand. In 
the point-based system outlined in Table XX, both of these events would have a point 
cost that would more than double the point cap used in Section 3.3.2. This large point 
difference can be largely attributed to how the country used in our analysis was defined. 
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The country was defined as being under effective government control at federal and 
local levels, which results in the covert acquisition and training of threat capabilities 
being much more difficult than in Russia during the early 2000s.  
 The Pakistani Naval Station (PNS) Mehran attack16 in 2011 is a good example of 
highly trained attackers utilizing insider intelligence. During this event at least 15 
attackers assaulted a Pakistani Naval Airforce base just outside Karachi. The attackers 
operated in several coordinated squads and exploited physical security system flaws to 
enter the facility undetected. Pakistan’s Naval Intelligence believes that insiders supplied 
information about which sections of the perimeter were not under active surveillance. 
The high level of preparation that went into the attack went undetected largely due to the 
lack of Pakistani influence in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas where the TTP 
operates. The large point cost of this attack using the values defined in Table XX further 
illustrates the need to adjust the capability costs of the point based system when hostile 
domestic forces exist, especially if corrupt members of the state’s government or 
military are believed to support these domestic forces. 
 In addition to raw combat capabilities, training, and insider support, the other 
major threat capability to accurately define is the type of specialized weapons the 
adversary possesses and is willing to use. While rare, chemical attacks have been 
performed by terrorist groups (though with only limited success). The most famous 
incident of a terrorist chemical attack is Aum Shinrikyo’s 1995 sarin gas attack17 in the 
Tokyo subway. Despite the fear the public holds for exotic weaponry such as chemical 
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weapons, their effect tends to be less efficient than more conventional explosives. Al 
Qaeda’s ability to convert airliners into human-guided missiles demonstrated how 
devastating unexpected vehicle based improvised explosive device (VBIED) capabilities 
can be. After the many cases of terrorists using VBIEDs against federal targets (the most 
famous being the bombing of the marine barracks in Lebanon), at least one scenario with 
the point-based DBT should include this capability.  
3.3.4 Point Based DBT Conclusions 
 Though the point-based DBT results in increased security, the point-based DBT 
has a slightly higher initial cost than conventional strictly defined DBTs based on the 
need for vulnerability assessment personnel. It is necessary to weigh the benefits against 
these increased costs. In the thesis test case, the point-based system revealed several 
large vulnerabilities that were missed when using the initial DBT.  This benefit could 
justify the increased initial costs. It is unlikely (hopefully) that most real facilities would 
possess such large vulnerabilities.  But when it comes to high consequence facilities, 
addressing even small vulnerabilities is important. A large portion of the costs associated 
with the proposed point-based DBT come from requiring vulnerability assessment teams 
whose members are familiar with the various facilities. 
Several measures can be taken to address the increased costs incurred from 
requiring dedicated vulnerability assessment staff. One option would be to continue to 
use conventional strict DBT definitions for lower grade facilities and implement the 
point-based system for high grade facilities, many of which are likely to already possess 
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vulnerability assessment staff in some form. Alternatively, several low grade facilities 
could have their point-based system managed by a single vulnerability assessment 
group, since development of a low point-cap DBT is comparatively easier than a high 
point-cap DBT. 
Based on the test case, we believe the benefits should outweigh the additional 
costs associated with the point-based DBT system for high consequence facilities. For 
lower risk facilities, the point-based DBT could still prove efficient if vulnerability 
assessment capabilities already exist or can be effectively shared between multiple sites. 
Over the long-run, the point based system could even be cheaper than using a strictly 
defined DBT. Each time a strictly defined DBT is changed by the competent authority, 
there is a chance it will reveal facility weaknesses that require costly upgrades that 
would have been caught during the security system’s development with the point-based 
system. If the point-based system is utilized during the initial development of a new 
security system, ideally any overly sensitive adversary capabilities will be caught and 
accounted for before physical security elements have been implemented (it is far cheaper 
to change a design than to upgrade systems that already exist). 
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4.  FUTURE WORK 
 The thesis work can be expanded in several different directions. The extent of 
additional work that can be performed while maintaining an open source status, 
however, is likely to be a limiting factor. There are two main directions that can be 
pursued with additional unclassified work, (1) further development of the proposed 
solutions and (2) a reexamination of the assumptions used in the analysis. 
 The point-based DBT system could be further validated with a cost-benefit 
analysis. This assessment could focus on the financial requirements of maintaining a 
vulnerability assessment team versus the costs associated with physical protection 
system upgrades required after a sudden escalation of the national threat spectrum. If 
updating a conventional DBT includes added or shifted adversary capabilities that 
exploit a previously unknown PPS vulnerability, sudden costly upgrades to the facility’s 
security system would be required. If the point-based DBT system had been used in the 
initial development of the PPS, shifts in the national threat spectrum would be less likely 
to result in large changes in PPS effectiveness, as the vulnerabilities would have already 
been found and mitigated.  
 The capability point costs could be further developed with comparisons to 
historic DBTs and actual incidents. If it is found that terrorist events in the same region 
demonstrate similar capabilities, the point costs could be more accurately defined to 
predict the capabilities of future attacks. Many of the specifics of recent terrorist attacks 
are classified, but estimates and press releases should be available. A consistently 
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accurate point cost is unlikely to be possible to define when looking at incidents 
conducted by different groups, in different locations, at different periods of time. It is 
also important to consider the adversary’s goal and target for each event. If their 
objective was simply to gain public attention, they are unlikely to have devoted a 
significant amount of resources. Attacking a nuclear depot or convoy would require a 
substantial resource investment, so only historic events that possessed similarly lofty 
goals should be analyzed.  
If security classification is not an issue, older DBTs could be used as a point cap, 
and terrorist events in the same time period could be compared. This approach could 
reveal whether DBTs have been historically over or under designed compared to the 
existing demonstrated threats. An unrealistically capable DBT results in excessive PPS 
investment while an under equipped DBT might result in the PPS systems not being 
properly configured to defeat an actual attack. The best situation would be a DBT that is 
more capable than what has been historically demonstrated, but not equipped to 
excessive levels. This approach allows slight perturbations from demonstrated 
capabilities to be defeatable while still resulting in efficient resource allocation. 
 Future work could also focus on the assumptions that were used in this thesis.  A 
major assumption used in the implementation of the risk equation resulted in the removal 
of the consequence factor. This simplification assumed that when all of the facilities 
possessed the same target, the consequence values would be equal. It was also assumed 
that consequence would not change with DBT capability perturbations because the 
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adversary’s objective would remain the same. This assumption could be invalid if certain 
capability shifts result in different adversary objectives. An adversary with advanced 
nuclear capabilities might have construction or detonation of an RDD or IND rather than 
theft of material as their goal. This adversary objective would result in a completely 
different consequence value. 
 The set of tested scenarios could also be expanded upon. Multiple targets in a 
fixed facility could be tested in a fashion similar to how the convoy scenarios were 
implemented. The main difference is that each target would be valid rather than possibly 
being a decoy. Each target could also have different PI and PN values, which makes the 
calculations slightly more complicated. An additional consideration is that attacking two 
identical targets successfully might not double the consequence value. For example, two 
RDD detonations in close proximity would not inflict twice the damage of a single RDD 
because the contamination fields would overlap (even accounting for the overlap area 
being more dangerous). In any case where consequence is not removed from the risk 
equation, consequence values must be developed for the various possible outcomes. This 
consequence valuation step was not performed in this thesis, and the actual values, as 
defined by the United States government, are likely to be classified.  
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5.  CONCLUSIONS 
 After testing perturbations of various DBT adversary capabilities against multiple 
facility security systems, we found that use of a strictly defined DBT fails to assure 
security measures are up to standards. Because a conventional DBT is designed to 
represent a realistic threat, each individual attack team capability cannot be raised to the 
degree a specialized adversary could attain. Our analysis showed the modeled facilities 
possessed vulnerabilities to several adversary capabilities that went undetected when the 
scenarios were analyzed with the original strictly defined graded DBT. By maximizing 
one capability at the expense of others, a specialized adversary force was able to 
efficiently defeat each facility’s security system.  
 Each adversary capability perturbation affected the probability of neutralization 
(PN) and/or the probability of interception (PI). The combat related capabilities (those 
that affect PN) predictably change PN based on where the balance of power rests when 
comparing the response force and the adversary force (shown in Fig. 10). When the 
response force is decidedly more effective than the adversary force, PN is resistant to 
adversary capability perturbations. It is common practice for the response force to have 
the advantage in engagements, not because they necessarily outnumber the adversary, 
but because they have better fighting positions, knowledge of the environment, and 
coordination through the central alarm station.  
The perturbation’s effects are slightly more complicated when multiple targets 
exist. Attacking multiple targets creates linear increases in either the probability of attack 
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(PA) or consequence value of the risk equation. When only one target is real and the rest 
are decoys, as was the case in the convoy scenarios, PA is changed. If all of the targets 
are real, the consequence value is changed. With sufficient combat capabilities, it can be 
advantageous to the adversary to split their capabilities and attack multiple targets 
simultaneously. When operating on the upper end of Fig. 10, the slight disadvantage to 
the adversary of increasing PN by splitting into an additional squad is outweighed by 
doubling PA (or consequence). If an increase in adversary capability crosses the point 
where it is efficient to attack an additional target, PN will actually increase due to there 
being fewer adversaries attacking each target. The overall security risk still increases 
because of the change in PA or consequence. 
 
 
Fig. 10. Probability of neutralization as a function of the effective response force (R) 
divided by the effective adversary force (A). 
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 Adversary capability perturbations that affected PI tended to produce greater 
increases in security risk than the combat related capabilities, but it is also possible to 
reduce the security system’s sensitivity to these perturbations with the careful use of 
conservative buffers. For most of the tested perturbations, the adversary’s most 
advantageous option is to take the path of minimum detection (stealth) until a critical 
detection point (CDP), at which point they shift to the fastest path (force). The CDP is 
defined as the point where detection and assessment must occur for the response force to 
have time to intercept the adversary. Large increases in risk occurred when the adversary 
capability perturbation changed the CDP. In this thesis, the CDP changed when the 
adversary overcame delay elements faster than expected (antitank weaponry), evaded 
detection elements (false identification and credentials), or increased the response force 
time (radio jamming equipment). For each CDP there is a corresponding time remaining 
after interception (TRI). If the perturbed capability does not hasten the adversary by 
more than the TRI, the CDP, and therefore the security risk, does not change. 
Implementing an amount of conservatism into the security system to ensure a substantial 
TRI mitigates the impact of the perturbations in most capabilities that affect PI. 
Increasing TRI is not an effective way to counter adversary capabilities that change 
detection values such as insider assistance and forged key cards (referred to as deceit 
rather than stealth or force). The best way to counter deceit is to use complementary 
overlapping detection elements (such as placing a biometric scanner alongside a badge 
reader). 
 68 
 The proposed-point based DBT system serves as a replacement to the existing 
strictly defined DBT system (the point-based system can still be graded or shared 
amongst facilities). In a point based DBT, the various adversary capabilities are given 
point costs related to the difficulty and expense of covertly acquiring, training, and 
deploying that capability. A total point cap is assigned to each facility based on the 
attractiveness of its material or consequences of a successful adversary attack. 
Vulnerability assessment personnel create several scenarios by spending points on 
different capabilities until the point cap is reached. Each scenario tests a different set of 
adversary capabilities to better explore any security system vulnerabilities that may 
exist. The example point-based DBT set up in Section 3 was able to identify the 
vulnerabilities that were missed when using the conventional strictly defined DBT. The 
initial startup costs for a point-based DBT is higher because of the need for vulnerability 
assessment teams. We believe the benefit of using the point-based DBT to identify site 
vulnerabilities outweighs the additional startup costs, especially if the vulnerabilities are 
identified during the initial design of the security system. If the vulnerabilities are 
identified at an early stage, the money saved by not having to later revise the security 
system should outweigh the expenses associated with maintaining a vulnerability 
assessment team. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
 
 
 
 
The facility descriptions below are in the detail and wording required to model 
the facilities used in this thesis with SAVI 4. If the reader is not interested in using SAVI 
4, the facility descriptions in Section 2.3 are recommended instead of the following 
descriptions. Security characteristics are presented one element at a time for each layer, 
in the terminology used by the program. Parameter wording matches the program’s 
selectable inputs and may not make sense to those unfamiliar with the program. Each 
security element description includes some combination of the overall element size, 
detection sensors, delay elements, presence and protection of posted security inspectors 
(SI), contraband detection, and alarm assessment. Each paragraph corresponds to an 
element found in the adversary sequence diagrams shown in Section 2.3. 
1 Facility One Layers 
1.1 Offsite 
 There are four points of access leading from offsite to the Limited Area including 
a perimeter fence, two vehicle gates, and a personnel portal. The perimeter fence is 
standard chainlink mesh without any intrusion detection measures or security inspectors 
regularly within visible range. Its main purpose is to designate the property line and 
display basic trespassing signs rather than to act as a point of detection or significant 
delay.  
 72 
Both vehicle portals have the same characteristics with one being on the north 
side of the facility and the other on the south. Access is not limited to site vehicles as this 
is the main point of entry for employees with civilian vehicles. A photo ID check for the 
driver and all passengers is required for entry to limit vehicular access to just employees. 
The gate itself is equivalent to 8 foot chainlink with outriggers and is monitored by a 
posted security inspector (SI) with small arms protection and a duress alarm.  
The personnel portal is the primary access point for visitors and does not serve 
the role of contraband detection. It is approximately 10m across with an interior small 
arms resistant SI post equipped with a duress alarm. Both the outer and inner doors are 
hollow core metal with no lock or hinge protection. The structure itself is equivalent to 8 
inch filled block.  
1.2 Limited Area 
 The Limited Area completely surrounds the higher security levels of the facility 
and provides the first real opportunities for detection of an adversary force. The shortest 
route through the Limited Area is 917m and is traversable by vehicle. Surrounding the 
Limited Area is a Perimeter Intrusion Detection and Assessment System (PIDAS) 
consisting of two 8 foot chainlink fences with outriggings distanced 5 m apart with 
concrete blocks in between. Both fences are outfit with vibration detectors and the 
central region features multiple complementary systems on either side of the concrete 
blocks. Alarm assessment is facilitated with overlapping CCTV coverage with instant 
replay capability. 
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 Passage through the PIDAS occurs at a personnel portal, a shipping and receiving 
portal, or a site vehicle gate. The personnel portal is the main route into and out of the 
Protected Area for site employees. While personal possessions, small packages, and 
tools/equipment are allowed through, shipments and cargo must be moved through the 
shipping and receiving portal instead. The entrance to the personnel portal is controlled 
with an electronically coded lock that is opened with a cleared employee badge swipe. 
The central section of the portal requires a fingerprint scan and PIN code while under 
surveillance of a SI. The SI post is small arms protected and equipped with a duress 
alarm. After proper authorization at the central section, the guard remotely unlocks the 
inner electronically coded lock. A cursory search is conducted on any possessions or 
equipment brought into the portal in the central region. All outgoing traffic also passes 
through a plastic scintillator portal SNM monitor. Detection at the outer and inner 
exterior sections of the portal is facilitated with exterior video motion sensors, a 
balanced magnetic switch on the door, and direct observation by security personnel at 
the outer section (but not the inner side). The central section also possesses video motion 
sensors and constant security surveillance. The inner and outer doors are hollow core 
metal with hinge protection and the walls and ceiling are equivalent to 8 inch filled 
block. In addition to the security inspectors located directly at the portal, randomized 
patrols pass by both the outer and inner sides. The overall distance across the portal is 
approximately 10m. 
 The cargo entrance to the Protected Area is a shipping and receiving vehicle 
portal. This entrance is limited to shipment vehicles and the authorized driver. Outer 
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access requires an authorization form and picture badge check before the electronically 
coded lock will be opened. A cursory search of entering and exiting vehicles is 
conducted and the central region, with ingoing vehicles being subjected to bomb search 
dogs and outgoing vehicles driving through a sodium iodide scintillator for SNM 
detection. After the central guard is satisfied that the vehicle does not possess 
contraband, the inner electronically coded lock is remotely opened. The outer and inner 
door and gates are monitored with balanced magnetic switches. Exterior video motion 
sensors are located on both inner and outer sides of the portal and interior video motion 
sensors are located in the central region as the primary means of detection in addition to 
near continuous security personnel presence at the outer and central regions.  The outer 
SI is within a small arms protected post while the central SI is exposed. Both are 
equipped with duress alarms. The flow of traffic on the outer side is controlled with 
concrete blocks to require entry at the gate. The gates are sliding 8 foot chainlink with 
outriggers while the guard doors are hollow core metal with hinge protection. The portal 
walls and ceiling are equivalent in delay to 8 inch filled blocks.  
 The third entrance through the PIDAS is a gate limited to site vehicles without 
shipments or large cargo. Picture ID checks, explosives search with bomb sniffing dogs, 
and a cursory search of possessions are conducted outside the gate. When the searches 
are complete the electronically coded gate is opened remotely. Outgoing traffic passes 
through a sodium iodide scintillator, but does not undergo an explosives search. 
Detection is provided with exterior video motion sensors located on either side of the 
gate in addition the continuous presence of security personnel on either side. The gate 
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position is monitored with a balanced magnetic switch. Concrete blocks on the exterior 
side limit the angle of approach to the 8 foot chainlink gate supported with outriggings. 
The exterior SI is positioned in a small arms resistant post while the inner SI is 
unprotected, both are equipped with duress alarms. 
1.3 Protected Area 
 The Protected Area is contained within the Limited Area’s PIDAS and contains 
the most vital buildings within the facility, including the designated target building for 
this scenario. Of the routes that lead into the Controlled Building, several pass directly 
from the Protected Area to a section designated the Controlled Room. The target 
building is split into the Target Area, Controlled Room, and Controlled Building. 
Pathways into the Controlled Building section include the front pedestrian portal, office 
windows, and the Controlled Building’s walls or ceiling. To pass directly into the 
Controlled Room the adversary can use a ventilation duct, the rear shipping and 
receiving doorway, or breach either the Controlled Room’s exterior walls or ceiling. The 
shortest route across the Protected Area is 402m. 
 The target building pedestrian portal is the main entrance for employees without 
shipments or cargo. Access into the portal requires a badge swipe to open the 
electronically coded outer lock. In the central section an exchange picture badge is 
provided after confirmation of an employee’s identification with a PIN check. Personnel 
passing through the central section pass through a portal metal detector capable of 
detecting ferrous materials and all forms of lead, a rigorous item search, explosives 
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vapor collection on entry, and a plastic scintillator SNM portal on exit. Video motion 
detectors are located on the exterior of the portal and within the central region along with 
security personnel generally on either side of the portal and always in the central region.  
Door positions are monitored with balanced magnetic switches and weight pads within 
the central region ensure that security personnel are capable of verifying the use of 
contraband portals. The entrance door to the portal is a steel turnstile to limit the flow of 
traffic while the inner door is hollow core metal with hinge and lock protection. The 
walls and ceiling are equivalent to 4 inch reinforced concrete. Random security patrols 
pass by the portal’s exterior and within the Controlled Building. The outer SI post is 
unprotected while the central post is small arms resistant; both are equipped with duress 
alarms. The portals length is approximately 10m. 
 The other three pathways into the Controlled Building include breaching the 
office windows, the walls, or the ceiling. The windows consist of a single layer of 
security glass with an inaccessible lock to effectively make the window unopenable. The 
maximum diameter passage of the window is 100cm. Multiple sensors are in place to 
detect window penetration and security patrols pass by both sides on a randomized 
schedule. Both the walls and the ceiling are equivalent to 8 inch reinforced concrete with 
an interior grid mesh to detect penetration. Security patrols pass by both sides of walls, 
but do not have a line of sight of the ceiling. The interior of the Controlled Building is 
monitored by complementary interior detectors. Assessment of a penetration alarm for 
any of these features is conducted through timely deployment of security personnel 
(regular SI personnel as opposed to the response force). 
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 The rear shipping and receiving doorway is limited to large shipments and cargo 
from designated delivery vehicles or packages and equipment from site vehicles. 
Entrance searches and ID checks are conducted on the outer side of the gate while exit 
searches are conducted within the building’s cargo bay. Entry requires an authorization 
form and picture badge check followed by inspection for explosives with bomb dogs, 
passage through a portal metal detector capable of detecting all forms of lead, and a 
rigorous search of the driver, packages, and cargo shipments. After the searches are 
successfully completed by the posted SI, the electronically coded central lock is 
remotely opened. Exiting vehicles undergo the same rigorous item search and portal 
metal detector, but also pass through a plastic scintillator SNM monitor. Intrusion 
detectors include exterior motion sensors on the outside of the doorway, conducting tape 
and a balanced magnetic switch on the door, and multiple complementary interior 
sensors inside the building as well as personnel always present on both sides. The outer 
SI is in a small arms protected post while the inner SI post is unprotected; both are 
equipped with duress alarms. Random SI patrols pass by both sides of the doorway. The 
door itself is a vehicle rollup door and leads directly to the Controlled Room. 
 To represent the vulnerabilities that exist in older facilities designed without a 
focus on security, a large ventilation duct crosses from the Protected Area to the 
Controlled Room. The duct is 20m across and has a maximum diameter passage of 1m. 
Two fixed barriers are in place, each secured with a high security padlock. The barriers 
are defined as heavy grid and have multiple penetration sensors in place. The region 
between the barriers is monitored with an interior microwave intrusion sensor and the 
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area beyond the inner barrier contains multiple complementary interior sensors. Alarm 
assessment is conducted using CCTV with instant replay capability. Random SI patrols 
pass by both sides of the ductwork. 
 The Controlled Room’s walls or ceiling can also be reached from the Protected 
Area. They are equivalent to 8 inch reinforced concrete with grid mesh surface 
penetration sensors. Multiple complementary interior sensors are on the interior side of 
the walls and ceiling, but there is no direct line-of-sight to the ceiling from the SI patrols 
that randomly pass through the area both outside and inside the target building. 
Activation of the penetration sensors results in automatic deployment of the response 
force. 
1.4 Controlled Building 
 From the Controlled Building, there are two pathways into the Controlled Room 
and one into the Target Area. The door into the Controlled Room requires a fingerprint 
scan and PIN to unlock an electronically coded lock. Multiple complementary interior 
sensors are present on both sides of the doorway to ensure security is aware of all 
personnel. The door’s condition is confirmed with a balanced magnetic switch and 
conducting tape to detect penetration. Alarm assessment is conducted with CCTV 
coverage with instant replay capability. The door is half inch steel plate and SI patrols 
pass by both sides on a randomized schedule. 
 Breaching the walls leads to either the Controlled Room or Target Area, 
depending on which section is destroyed. Both sections of wall have multiple surface 
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penetration sensors and complementary interior sensors on either side. In both cases, the 
wall is equivalent to 8 inch reinforced concrete and an alarm results in automatic 
deployment of the response force. Random SI patrols pass by the exterior and interior of 
the Controlled Room wall and the exterior of the Target Area wall. In all cases, it is 
approximately 20m across the Controlled Building. 
1.5 Controlled Room 
 Within the Controlled Room is a vault defined as the Target Area. The vault can 
be entered through either the vault door or breaching the surrounding walls. No matter 
the entrance point into the Controlled Room, it is assumed 10m must be traversed to get 
to the next security element. 
 Entrance through the vault door requires a fingerprint scan and PIN before the 
central alarm station (CAS) unlocks the electronically coded lock. The door is a Class V 
vault door. An unprotected SI is posted next to the door with a duress alarm. Alarm 
assessment is performed by the posted SI or with CCTV coverage with instant replay. 
 The vault wall is equivalent to 8 inch reinforced concrete and possesses multiple 
surface penetration sensors which trigger an automatic deployment of the response force. 
Multiple complementary interior sensors are located on both sides of the wall to ensure 
the CAS can track individuals within the facility. 
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1.6 Target Area 
 The target is located 2m within the Target Area inside a security cage. The 
outside of the enclosure is made of security glass with the target tied down within. An 
authorization check with the CAS is required each time the location is accessed before 
two separate high security padlocks are allowed to be opened. Each cleared material 
custodian is issued a key that only unlocks a single padlock to ensure that the two person 
direct observation rule is enforced. Sensor coverage throughout the target area and cage 
is ensured with multiple complementary interior sensors. The security glass enclosure 
possesses multiple penetration sensors and a balanced magnetic switch on the doorway. 
The target itself is tied down with wire and secured with a lock. Alarm assessment is 
conducted with CCTV cameras with instant replay that are monitored whenever 
personnel are within the vault. 
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2 Facility Two Layers 
2.1 Property Protection Area 
 The Property Protection Area can be entered easily by a small adversary force 
without detection so it plays the same role as the Offsite layer of Facility One. The three 
options for entering the Limited Area include breaching the outer fence, the personnel 
portal, or the shipping/receiving portal. A vehicle can be used for any of these elements 
and its continued use in the Limited Area is represented in Layer A of the ASD (which 
requires the adversary to take the longer vehicle accessible road). If the vehicle is 
abandoned to pursue to shorter on-foot path the adversary crosses into Layer B of the 
ASD instead of Layer A.  
 The outer perimeter is surrounded by a chainlink fence over 12 foot with 
outriggings with concrete blocks on either side to slow or stop vehicles. The fence is 
outfit with vibration sensors that are assessed by light anti-tank resistant (LAW) resistant 
SI towers just within the fenceline. Because the fenceline is large compared to the 
number of SI personnel in the towers the fenceline is not considered to be under general 
observation. The primary purpose of the guard towers is assessment and response 
compared to initial detection.  
 Access into and out of the Limited Area through the personnel portal requires a 
picture ID badge and PIN to open electronically coded locks. Personal possessions are 
allowed through the portal, but packages, tools/equipment, and shipments or cargo are 
not. Security inspectors are posted in a LAW resistant tower that oversees incoming 
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traffic, a central small arms protected duress alarm equipped post that ensures only 
personal possessions are brought in or out, and an unprotected duress alarm equipped 
inner post that handles outgoing traffic. Intrusion detection features include exterior 
video motion sensors at the entrance and exit, conducting tape door penetration sensors, 
balanced magnetic switches to monitor door position, multiple complementary interior 
sensors in the central section, and near continuous general observation at all points. Both 
doors are steel turnstiles and the portal’s walls are equivalent to 8 inch filled block. 
Employees must use the shipping and receiving portal to bring larger packages into the 
Limited Area. 
  Access through the shipping and handling portal is prohibited to civilian or 
personal vehicles. Additionally, passengers are not allowed even when in site or delivery 
vehicles. Authorization forms and picture badges are required at the outer section for 
entering traffic and at the inner level for exiting traffic. The outer lock is inaccessible 
and unlocked from a distance by the alarm station. Bombing sniffing dogs are used on 
entering traffic. Both entering and exiting vehicles are subjected to a rigorous cargo 
search. Intrusion detection at the inner and outer levels is performed by video motion 
detectors, conducting tape and balanced magnetic switches on the doors, and by 
personnel generally in the vicinity. The central section possesses multiple 
complementary sensors with personnel always in the vicinity. The walls are made of 8 
inch filled block with vehicle liftups at the entrance and exit. LAW resistant towers are 
located on outer and inner sections, a small arms resistant post with a duress alarm is in 
the central section, and an additional unprotected SI is posted on the inner level with a 
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duress alarm. The portal is 10 meters across and assessment is performed by the Posted 
SI’s. 
2.2 Limited Area 
 The Limited Area is 950 meters across when using a vehicle and 150 meters 
when using the pedestrian route. Surrounding the Limited Area is a PIDAS consisting of 
two 12 foot chainlink fences with outriggings distanced 5 m apart with concrete blocks 
and concertina wire in between. Both fences are outfit with multiple detectors and the 
central region features multiple complementary systems on either side of the concrete 
blocks. Alarm assessment is facilitated with overlapping CCTV coverage with instant 
replay capability. 
 Passage through the PIDAS occurs at a personnel portal and a shipping and 
receiving portal. The personnel portal is the main route into and out of the Protected 
Area for site employees. Only personal possessions are allowed through the portal in 
normal circumstances. The entrance to the personnel portal is controlled with a 
mechanically coded lock that is opened by an SI after showing credentials and entering a 
PIN. The central section of the portal provides an exchange picture badge. The outer side 
of the portal features a LAW resistant tower, the central SI post is small arms protected 
and equipped with a duress alarm, and the inner SI post possesses a duress alarm but is 
unprotected. All traffic is subjected to bomb sniffing dogs in the central section. 
Detection at the outer and inner exterior sections of the portal is provided by video 
motion sensors, a balanced magnetic switch and conducting tape on the door, conducting 
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tape in the walls, and direct observation by security. The central section possesses 
multiple complimentary sensors and constant security surveillance. The inner and outer 
doors are steel turnstiles and the walls and ceiling are equivalent to 4 inch reinforced 
block. The overall distance across the portal is approximately 5m. 
 The cargo entrance to the Protected Area is a shipping and receiving vehicle 
portal. This entrance is limited to shipment vehicles, site vehicles, and the authorized 
driver. Outer access requires an authorization form and an exchange picture badge 
before the inaccessible lock will be opened. A rigorous search of entering and exiting 
vehicles is conducted in the central region, with ingoing vehicles being subjected to 
bomb search dogs and outgoing vehicles driving through a sodium iodide scintillator for 
SNM detection. After the central guard is satisfied that the vehicle does not possess 
contraband, the inner mechanically coded lock is remotely opened. The outer and inner 
door and gates are monitored with balanced magnetic switches. Exterior video motion 
sensors are located on both inner and outer sides of the portal and interior multiple 
complementary sensors are located in the central region in addition to continuous 
security personnel presence at all sections of the portal.  The outer SI is within a LAW 
resistant tower, the central SI is within a duress equipped small arms resistant post, and 
the inner SI is within a duress equipped unprotected post.  The gates are vehicle liftups 
while the portal walls and ceiling are 4 inch reinforced concrete.  
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2.3 Protected Area 
 The Protected Area is 125 m across. There are two elements separating the 
Protected Area from the Material Access Area (MAA), a personnel portal and a concrete 
wall. The concrete wall is equivalent to 4 inch reinforced concrete with multiple surface 
penetration monitors. These sensors result in an automatic deployment of the response 
force should they be tripped. In addition to the penetrations sensors, there are random SI 
patrols on either side of the wall. 
 The personnel portal is the main access point into the MAA. It is 10 meters 
across and all forms of possessions, packages, tools, and cargo are allowed through. The 
outer section requires an exchange picture badge and PIN before the inaccessible lock is 
remotely opened. The central station requires a fingerprint scan along with re-entering 
the PIN. When exiting the MAA, the exchange badge is returned in the inner section of 
the portal. Explosives detection is facilitated with vapor collection and a portal metal 
detector is in place to identify all ferrous materials and forms of lead. Items are 
rigorously searched and personnel are subjected to a patdown. Detection at the inner and 
outer sections is performed with video motion sensors, multiple penetration sensors and 
balanced magnetic switches for the doors, multiple penetration sensors in the walls, and 
personnel always in the vicinity. The central section possesses multiple complementary 
intrusion sensors and is always manned by personnel. The walls are equivalent to 4 inch 
reinforced concrete and the doors are steel turnstiles. The outer SI is in a LAW resistant 
tower, the central SI is in a duress equipped small arms resistant post, and the inner SI is 
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in an unprotected duress alarm equipped post. Alarm triggers result in deployment of the 
response force. 
2.4 Material Access Area 
 The main entrance from the MAA into the target building is a personnel portal. It 
is 125 m across the MAA and 6 m across the portal. Personnel possessions are not 
allowed through. The outer section requires an exchange picture badge and PIN before 
the mechanically and electronically coded locks are opened (there are two separate 
locks). The inner section requires a fingerprint scan along with re-entering the PIN to 
open an electronically coded lock. There is also a manually activated evacuation alarm 
in the inner section. When exiting the MAA, the exchange badge is returned in the inner 
section of the portal. Explosives detection is facilitated with vapor collection and a portal 
metal detector is in place to identify all ferrous materials and forms of lead. Items are 
rigorously searched and personnel are subjected to a patdown. Detection at the outer 
section is performed with multiple complementary intrusion sensors, multiple 
penetration sensors and balanced magnetic switches for the doors, multiple penetration 
sensors in the walls, and personnel always in the vicinity. The inner section features the 
same detection measures, but without personnel in the vicinity. The central section 
possesses multiple complementary intrusion sensors and is always manned by personnel. 
The walls are equivalent to 8 inch filled block and the doors are hollow core metal. The 
outer SI is in a LAW resistant tower and the central SI is in a duress equipped small 
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arms resistant post. Alarm triggers, including the evacuation alarm, are assessed posted 
SI with duress alarms. 
 The next security level can also be reached by breaching through the building’s 
wall. Based on which section is breached, the attacker can either enter the target 
building, the radiation area, or the vault. All three sections of wall possess multiple 
complementary sensors on both sides and multiple surface penetration sensors within. 
An alarm trip automatically deploys the response force. The section of wall that allows 
entrance into the building is 8 inch filled block, the wall that allows entrance into the 
radiation area is 4 inch reinforced concrete, and the wall that allows entrance into the 
vault is 8 inch reinforced concrete. 
2.5 Target Building 
 Inside the Target Building is another security portal (25 m from the entrance) that 
limits access into the Radiation Area. It is 6 meters across and personal possessions are 
not allowed through. The outer section requires an exchange picture badge and PIN 
before the mechanically and electronically coded locks are opened (there are two 
separate locks). The inner section requires a fingerprint scan along with re-entering the 
PIN to open an electronically coded lock. There is also a manually activated evacuation 
alarm in the inner section. When exiting the MAA, the exchange badge is returned in the 
inner section of the portal.  A portal metal detector is in place to identify all ferrous 
materials and forms of lead and a plastic scintillator portal detects SNM. Items are 
rigorously searched and personnel are subjected to a patdown. Detection at the inner and 
 88 
outer sections is performed with video motion sensors, multiple penetration sensors and 
balanced magnetic switches for the doors, multiple penetration sensors in the walls, and 
personnel always in the vicinity. The central section possesses multiple complementary 
intrusion sensors and is always manned by personnel. The walls are equivalent to 4 inch 
reinforced concrete and the doors are steel turnstiles. A central SI is in a duress equipped 
small arms resistant post. Alarm triggers are assessed by the duress alarm equipped SI. 
 The walls inside the Target Building can also be breached to enter the Radiation 
Area. Multiple complementary intrusion sensors are on either side of the wall along with 
multiple penetration sensors. An alarm trip results in automatic response force 
deployment. The wall’s delay is equivalent to 4 inch reinforced concrete. 
2.6 Radiation Area 
 The main path from the Radiation Area into the Target Area (the vault) is a Class 
V vault door that is 25 m from the entrance. Multiple complementary intrusion sensors 
are on either side of the door along with multiple penetration sensors and a balanced 
magnetic switch. Entrance into the vault requires a fingerprint scan, PIN, and the 
combination to a high security padlock. The various alarms result in automatic 
deployment of the response force. 
 The walls surrounding the vault have multiple complementary intrusion detection 
sensors on either side and multiple surface penetration sensors. An alarm trip results in 
automatic response force deployment. The wall is equivalent to 8 inch reinforced 
concrete. 
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2.7 Target Area – Vault 
 The target is held down in a cage 10 m within the vault. The central alarm station 
surveys activity within the vault through CCTV whenever workers are present and they 
verify the authorization of each worker before the work is performed. A strict two person 
rule requiring dedicated observation is in place. There are two high security padlocks on 
the cage, with each worker only knowing the combination to one. Multiple signals are 
required before the criticality alarm will trip, to reduce the chance of a false positive. 
Multiple complementary intrusion sensors are located throughout the vault and the cage 
is equipped with multiple penetration sensors and a balanced magnetic switch. The 
targets presence within the cage is monitored with another balanced magnetic switch and 
a remotely viewable tamper monitor. The cage door and surface are made of 9 gauge 
wire mesh and the target is tied down with wire secured with a bolt. 
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